Anirudh Deshpande

Investigating Marathi Primary Sources


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Investigating Marathi Primary Sources: The Struggle Between Survival and Death in the Turbulent 18th C

Remains of a room proclaim its former occupant Sadashiva Rao, known as Bhausaheb, in Marathi sources a national martyr in Shaniwar Wada, Pune convincing the mesmerized tourists that medieval people were animated by their ideas. The sources beg to differ. The voices of the past, provided we listen to them, inveigh against strident nationalism. If the nation was missing from 18th Century action could it have been present in the quotidian life of the Marathi speaker in turbulent Hindustan? Let us examine the primary sources like Panipatchi Bakhar, Bhausahebanchi Kaifiyat and Bhausahebanchi Bakhar of the 18th Century to see whether they square with the nationalist imaginations which have influenced the Indians’ historical thought since the 19th Century. A close inspection of the mentioned primary sources inveighs against describing the pre-colonial Indian past in conceptual terms which are clearly modern and emerged in the colonial episteme of the 19th Century. The abiding influence of this essentially colonial episteme in dominant post-colonial Indian historical thinking makes our revisit to the 18th Century via vernacular sources historically relevant and politically important[1].

I

Ewadhe hattas padaavyanche kaaran naahin. Aapan ujnees saal majkuri chaavnya karravya. Pestar saali shatru aapan paahaatach aahon. Punyaas jaawyachi khavindas sharam vaatel tar alikade ganga athwaa narmada athwa kshipra ewadhyaa sthali mukkam varsha saah mahine karoon, sarva sardar, ghode, hatti va oont va tatte, paidalva topkhana yaanche bail va avantar sena khaoon pioon hushaar houn pestar saali roomshamchi khabar gheoon! hinduche musalmaan houn parantu chatrapatiche naav raakhoon, yaat antar naahin[1].[2].
– Malharraoji Holkar to Bhausaheb, 1761.

In 1753-4 a Maratha army of “one and a quarter lakhs of men” under Raghunathrao crossed the Narmada and stage by stage “exacting tribute” reached the “lands of Surajmal Jat.” Experienced commanders Malharrao Holkar, Jayaji Shinde, Vithal Shivdeo, Antaji Mankeshvar, Govindpant Bundele and Yashvantrao Pavar led various divisions of this army. Since Raghunathrao had successfully collected tribute from Udaipur, Kota, Bundi, and Jainagar (Jaipur), Suraj Mal sent his minister Ruparam Katari to parley. The campaign was important to Raghunathrao’s ambitions so he refused the forty lakh rupees offered by Katari and demanded a crore. In response Suraj Mal prepared Bharatpur and Deeg for a long siege and entrenched himself in Kumbher. He offered forty lakhs again and, in anticipation of war, he sent the Marathas “five musket balls and powder.”  Kumbher was besieged on 20 January 1754 but Maratha artillery failed against its cleverly designed walls and sand banks. The low shots fell into the sand. The higher ones crossed the fort and harmed the besiegers on the other side. The Maratha “queen was in check; from within the fort no one would come out to parley, and so in all one and a half months went by.”[3] On 19 March, 1754 a Jat swivel gun shot killed Khanderao, the only biological son of Malharrao Holkar. The grief stricken veteran sardar, to whom several Rajput rulers paid tribute, swore revenge. This was reported to Surajmal by Katari in the following words, “Malharrao’s only son is dead and in the grief of it he has taken a mighty oath saying – If I am the son of my father I will extirpate the race of the Jat and dig up Kumbher and throw it in the Jumna.”[4] The two month siege had frustrated the Marathas and exhausted the Jats. Since the Maratha army was in arrears and the Jats were short of provisions, tobacco, gunpowder and shot and a face saving bargain emerged. Surajmal exploited the differences among the Marathas and, advised by his wife Anusuya and Katari, approached Jayaji Shinde with whom he was friends despite his conflict with the Marathas:

Ruparam and this woman met together with Surajmal and took counsel saying: “The thing cannot be done; no plan can be devised; life’s end has come upon us,” and as they spoke Anusuya made answer, “One thing we can attempt, and without that there is no other. There is friendship between you and the noble Jayaji Shinde, and he is a man of deeds and keeps his word. If he were won over he would be a means to save you. Otherwise there is no other remedy to be thought of.” Upon hearing it this plan was acceptable to all, and deciding upon it Ruparam Katari sent with his son Tejram a letter and the turban from the head of Surajmal, and he came by night to the tent of the noble Jayaji Shinde and most humbly spoke and said, “At this time you are the elder brother and I the younger. Save me by whatever means may be thought of.” Thus the minister made his plea and he placed upon Shinde’s head the turban of Surajmal and took to himself Shinde’s turban saying, “Save our honour from disgrace!” Hearing this Jayaji Shinde almost swooned and in his mind he thought, “If I take his part the charge of treason to my lord will be laid to me and (yet) it is the code of Hindustan that once men have become brothers of the turban they should give their all and never turn their backs but protect each other. Therefore this was done. And if I take this side I scant my service. Both ways are perilous, and which is the stronger, which the weaker duty?” Then he put the question to four high and well-beloved counselors who were there and they considering which was the stronger, said, “He who seeks protection should be received and let him never fear death. This is the true word of the law-books and this is the stronger duty.” As he heard this the future was assured…Jayaji Shinde was a man of pride. Accepting this (submission) he sent into the city his turban with turmeric and bel leaves and a letter of assurance. To Surajmal, when in this way he received the turban and heard the news, it seemed he had been born again, and his courage was redoubled…And from the siege-works grain, powder and shot began to pass into the city, and so a few days went by[5].

Jayaji also became the “turban-brother” of Ramsingh by accepting the turmeric, bel and turban brought by his minister Chetram. The drummers were ordered to sound the striking of the camp and the siege section entrusted to the Shindes was lifted. Finally, Raghunathrao accepted sixty lakh rupees and the siege ended.

II

A besieged commander also became the “son” of one of the besiegers. In 1757 the Marathas besieged the Delhi Red Fort after Ahmad Shah returned to Kandahar:

Then Dadasaheb, passing close by Agra, exacted tribute from Surajmal Jat and removed Gajiudikhan who was in Agra and took him with him. From there he marched with Gajiudikhan stage by stage to Delhi. (Once again it was) destruction for the city. Each soldier came seizing what he could [and] went about his affairs. Having thus looted the city they set siege to the fort. For fifteen days Najibkhan resisted but he knew full well that the Marathas would never give up and there would be no assistance from Abdul Ali. Now he would have to save himself and therefore he sent his innermost counselor to Malharrao Holkar and said, “I am as a son to you in God’s sight. Save me. He who submits should never fear death. Greatness of heart is fitting to the strong.” When this had been spoken Malharrao Hokar, who was full of self-pride, made a resolve: “Since Najibkhan calls himself my son he must be saved.” And so he went to the noble Dadasaheb and employing many means, threatening and beseeching, he asked for some reward for Najibkhan. In his heart Dadasaheb thought that Najibkhan was a vile traitor and that he should not be allowed to depart with his life, but Malharrao’s influence was great and he found that he could not escape it. And so he was forced to agree. Then Malharrao drew Najibkhan out from the fort and placed him with him.[6]

In 1760 Surajmal accompanied Bhausaheb to Delhi despite their disagreement on warring against Ahmad Shah. After plundering Delhi, the Jats, who knew Abdali better than Bhausaheb, needed an excuse to return to Bharatpur. They disliked the arrogant Bhausaheb who was new to Hindustan:

Then an idea came to Bhau such as fits the saying, “the mind is darkened when the end comes near.” Bhausaheb had been harassing Govindpant Bundele and asking for fifty lakhs of rupees, and he choosing his time saying that he went to fetch them departed for Bundelkhand with Prajajipant Vagh. Because of this same need for money for his expenses Bhau’s gaze fell upon the silver canopy which was adorned with gold and gilded work and was spread above the emperor’s throne. He thought to himself that it would be a good plan to remove this canopy and employ it to pay the army and in its place they could easily place boards of wood. Therefore he consulted Shinde, Holkar and Surajmal Jat, whereupon Surajmal Jat beseeched him saying, “Bhausaheb, the place of the emperor’s throne is not to be slighted. Formerly when Nadirshah came he took away the layer of gold from off the throne but did not lay hands on the canopy. After that the emperor of Kandahar Abdul Ali twice came. He carried away the very guns but held back from this. Now some of the emperor’s noblemen are your followers. Such things should not be done before our eyes. No success will come to us from this and the charge of treachery will be laid to us. Therefore at this present time grant me this request at least. If have great need for your expenses command me and I will give your lordship five lakhs of rupees.” When he heard this Bhau thought, “If he gives five lakhs of rupees there will be that much extra,” and so he rejected his advice and took down the whole canopy. When it was weighed out into rupees it made in all three lakhs. At that time the earth trembled, people began to speak ill words and they say that thunderbolts fell to earth. At that time many were outraged[7].

Surajmal also insisted that Bahusaheb replace the canopy and not leave Delhi to attack Kunjpur. Soon he was informed by Malharao and Shinde that Bhausaheb and Balavantrao were “fully resolved” to imprison him and “plunder his quarters.”  Thus forewarned, and on Ruparam Katari’s advice, the Jats removed the bells from their elephants and other animals and slipped out under the watch of Holkar and Shinde[[8]]. Some hours later Bhausaheb was informed and a Maratha party in pursuit could only plunder a part of Surajmal’s baggage train. In 1754 Malharrao had vowed to extirpate the Jats !

III

For Bhausaheb, ‘vinaashkaale viparit buddhi’ happened soon after the incident recounted above. Upon the fall of Kunjpur the son in law of Najibkhan Rohila and his father and the commanders Sayad Amadkhan Katalbaj and Kutubshah were taken prisoner. Around 5000-7000 Pathans were killed during and after combat [9]. This victory and greed for treasure turned Bhausaheb’s head and created the immediate context of the Panipat defeat:

Then Damaji Gaikvad set Kutubshah upon an elephant and sent him before Bhausaheb and his chief minister said to Bhausaheb, “Kutubshah has fallen to us, but do you now take him,” thus he spoke. Then [the prisoner] himself came near and when saw him a great wave of anger overtook Bhausaheb and the hairs upon his body bristled. Then he said, “Why have you mounted this incestuous dog so honourably?” and abusing him in this manner he commanded, “Cast him down from the elephant.” Kutbshah hearing this himself leapt down and when he had been seized and brought before him Bhausaheb said to him, “Now speak whatever you know.” When he said this Kutubshah thought to himself, “Now that I am taken and in their power no one will save even though I speak humbly,” and therefore he replied, “What is it in your mind to do? If you wish to make truce then spare me and according to your desires I will make peace for you with the Durrani and the Rohila. And if this cannot be, then take fifty lakhs of rupees and set me free. But if it be your resolution to make war then set a ransom and having taken it release me. Then within fifteen days I will be prepared to make war beside you with twenty five thousand men.” Then Bhausaheb asked him, “Was it not you who cut off the head of Dattaji Shinde?” Hearing this Kutubshah thought in his mind, “Now he touches the quick. He will never let me go with my life.” Then knowing that it was folly to be suppliant he spoke out saying, “We followed our own law. In our Koran it is determined that one should cut off one’s enemy’s head and plant it on a spear and then beat the drums. In this way did we act.” Hearing this, Bhausaheb’s anger rose from the soles of his feet to the crown of his head and the hairs rose up upon his body. The ocean of his wrath overflowed its banks and he gave the order , “Take him beneath the standard and cut off his head.” Hearing this Malharrao and Jankoji Shinde beseeched him saying “By sparing him you might achieve great benefit. Dattaji Shinde will not rise again through his death.” Thus did they advise discretion, but the fires of anger would not be appeased in Bhausaheb and he again gave the order to cut off his head. Then they took him to the standard. Kutubshah asked for water to drink and it was fitting that it should be given. However, all were enraged by the account of what had happened to Dattaji Shinde and none felt any pity. Cruelly they said, “Give the monster urine to drink!” and straightaway lopped off his head. He received no burial. The crows and jackals devoured him where he lay before the standard. In the same way was killed Saidkhan Katalbaj who also had been taken. Fifteen thousand men of these two captains were killed. Afterwards, they ransacked Kunjpur. Much booty was acquired according to each man’s fortune. In the fort were Najibkhan’s son in law and his father. They were also taken with their families and children, and from a desire of riches, they were tormented greatly with burning wicks between their fingers [so] they might show where Najibkhan’s treasure was hidden [10] [emphasis added]. 

Najibkhan and Abdali heard of this “bit their lips and wrung their wrists” and resolved to teach Bhausaheb a lesson. Marching sixty kos daily their army crossed the Yamuna near Baghpat and blocked the road to Delhi.

IV       

In 1754 Jayaji Shinde was hired by Ram Singh of Marwar against his brother Vijay Singh. Shinde marched into Marwar to restore his ‘turban brother’ to the throne of Nagaur in return for a substantial sum at the cost of Vijay Singh. Vijay Singh fielded a well equipped army to stop the advancing Shinde army and his determination and the reputation of Rajput valour momentarily demoralized the Marathas left with the choice of either fighting or retreating. Retreat meant loss of face and money and was ruled out by Jayaji:

They were Rathod Rajputs, strong and fierce, and they thought nothing of the Marathas’ power. Hearing of this Jayaji Shinde summoned all the noblemen and said, “The Marwadis are mighty Rajputs and very bold, and the fierceness of their valor is such that when you cut of their heads the trunk still dances. Once by their courage they loosed the turban of Durani Giljiya, Emperor of Kandhar, and cut the crupper of his horse; and still in token of this the Giljiyas go turbanless and their horses without cruppers. And they have much artillery. But on our side are only the raw spirits of our soldiers, their weapons of steel, and once they break if you tie them to a tree they will pull it out by the roots to flee.”[11]

Finally the Marathas suffered heavy casualties and won by the “virtues of King Shahu”:

Such slaughter was there, yet the Marathas must feel that blessed were the Rajput mothers that bore such children…Those Marwadis whose wounds were in front, their women saluted them and praised them; and those whose wounds were on their backs were abandoned by their wives. In the land of Marwar this is the custom. To receive a wound upon the front is good, but otherwise the woman should not look upon the face of her man. How may the deeds of men be recommended in a place where the hearts of women are of such a kind [12].

This above was written when Maratha identity was changing and new roles were being assigned to the Maratha women. Practices like purdah and sati were becoming popular among the Marathas and the Brahmans. When Khanderao was killed at Kumbher, two of his wives, seven concubines and two courtesans were made sati. Ahilyabai was spared because Malharrao was especially fond of her [13]. Balwantrao Mehendale’s wife chose immolation upon her husband’s death despite Bhausaheb requesting her to live for her young son at Panipat [14]. On the eve of the great Battle Bhausaheb is said to have ordered a massacre of families in the event of defeat. The bodyguards were ordered to “effect it so that it may never be said the wife of Bhausaheb had fallen into the hand of Giljiyas.”[15]Parvati Bai, his wife, survived the carnage and returned to the Desh.

The tendency to emulate the Rajputs put some Maratha commanders like Dattaji Shinde beyond the pale of wise council. His wife Bhagirathi Bai admonished him when he refused to see the consequences of Abdali’s 1759 invasion. When Abdali invaded Punjab, Shuja-ud-Daulah and Najib Khan Rohilla joined hands in Rohilkhand awaiting his arrival in the Doab. With each day the possibility of the main body of Dattaji’s army in the Antarved near Shukratal [the northern part of the Ganga-Jamuna doab] being attacked from the west by the rapidly advancing Afghan columns grew stronger. Facing this danger Dattaji’s wife read him the survival code:

…the wife of Dattaji Shinde, in a private place abandoning all deference said to him – “Forty thousand men of the army of Abdul Ali Durrani have crossed the river at Attock and entered the region of Lahore. Of our own army some are scattered, some which were in Punjab we know not what has become of them, but you know this news most certainly. Thus the net is spread upon all four sides. But you have become besotted with riches and valor and emulation, and we and our wives and children must be caught by the Durrani and die or else become slaves in the houses of the enemy [16].

And just before Dattaji got himself killed in Burari (January, 1760), Bhagirathi Bai and Naro Shankar, an experienced commander, lectured Dattaji on customs. Facing imminent defeat, Dattaji addressed Naro Shankar, Govindpant Bundele and his nephew Jankoji Shinde:

We know full well that the end of our life’s span has come. To what end should the women and children live? Some must live and keep this world and some must die and lose it. We should slaughter the women and children and hobble our elephants and die fighting. Defeat is worse than death. Having suffered defeat how can we show our faces to Nanasaheb and Bhausaheb? Now I have decided to die and cannot think of anything else.[17]

Naro Shankar begged to differ:

Do as you have spoken but do not have the women and children killed. Such a deed was done once or twice by the kings of the Shaka people and in Hindustan the rajas of Bundi and Kota who are Hada Rajputs might do such things. But for Marathas the bonds of family affection are never broken and such things cannot be done. It would be best if you send them on their way, but if not we will send away our own families.

V

Marathas who appreciated the difference between Mughals of the Deccan and Afghans from Afghanistan were more likely to survive combat in north India. In contrast, those fresh from the Desh paid for their overconfidence. The BB mentions a military incident which occurred soon after the Afghans blocked the road to Delhi to underline this:

Afterwards Baji Hari and Bhagvantrao Kadam and Yesaji Bhoite who was with Shinde were sent out with five or six thousand men as a scouting party. They departed and halted at a place where the Durrani army was five kos away. They too had never seen the enemy’s face and without any order they threw down their saddle-cloths and sat smoking their hubble-bubbles. Some began to graze their horses in the fields of millet. Some went to sleep. Seeing all this Yesaji Bhoite said to them, ‘You are come as scouts and the Giljiya is five kos away from here. Having heard this do you sit here calmly? These are not Moguls from the Desh! The Durrani raids are sudden. Do not be careless.’ Then they all shrugged off his words and striking hand one with another made jokes against him saying. ‘The troops of Shinde and Holkar have taken fright. Whatever things they say are spoken out of cowardice.’ Then hearing this Yesaji Bhoite kept silent and sent one of his good men in a tree as a look-out and himself mounted his horse and stood to. Then all at once the look-out began to cry out from the tree, ‘A crowd of horsemen is coming two kos away from here. I can see their dust.’ The moment that he said this, the Shinde soldiers, being experienced, hastily mounted their horses and once again they advised the others that they should quickly mount up. And again they mocked them, biding their time and remaining as they were. Then they saw the dust, and Yesaji Bhoite abandoned that place and began to flee in the direction of the main army. Then all at once the cavalry force itself was seen and in great confusion they went to find their horses. Then he alone was mounted who was alert and whose horse was near. The rest were not allowed to reach their horses before the Giljiyas were amongst them, and they had taken an oath that they would cut off and take the head of any man that they could seize. So as the soldiers under Baji Hari began to flee at full gallop towards the army, the Giljiyas mingled with them and came on until they could see the main standard of the camp. When they saw the standard the Durranis turned back. At that time the heads of twelve hundred men of the scouting party were lopped off and taken. When this news was known in the army their hearts sank and Bhausaheb’s resolution to go to Delhi was ended [18]

There is a reference to Afghan discipline and post battle mercy in the source. After the Battle of Panipat, the sons of Kutubshah and Saidkhan Katalbaj, approached Abdali with a request for revenge. What happened is narrated by the Bakhar:

Afterwards the sons…made a request to the Shah saying, ‘Give us leave to slaughter’ and straightaway Abdul Ali spoke, ‘How the slain be slaughtered? What virtue is there in that?’ And hearing this they asked again, ‘They slaughtered our father Kutubshah with his army and we must take revenge’ and they stood their ground before him. Then Abdul Ali said, ‘For twenty kos from this place and for two hours you may slay, and then no more.’ Upon hearing this, the son of Kutubshah slaughtered four thousand troops close to Sonpat and likewise the son of Amadkhan Langda came near to Bahadurgarh and there slew five thousand men. They closed the gates of the city of Panipat and held all prisoner, but then the strict command went forth, ‘You should kill no men but take their goods and let them go,’ and therefore on the following day none were killed. Of those shut in the city they tool captive up to twenty thousand. For two days they were held within the army, then Sujayatdaula gave three lakhs of rupees to the Giljiyas and released them as an act of piety. Sujayatdaula made search upon the battle-field also and fetching in those great men who could be recognized gave them the best of obsequies[19]. [emphasis added]

As thousands of disoriented Marathas reached Delhi from Panipat, the locals, including women, fell on them. “There was great uproar in the city and Naro Shankar and all those with him escaped with their lives only by fighting. The treasury remained where it was.”[20] The harried fugitives reached Mathura via Faridabad and “thousands of men, some being great ones, half naked, begging their way like mendicants, without food, without clothes, pale and downcast, living off leaves of wild spinach, came at last to the territory of the Jats.”[21] Surajmal rose to the occasion. It was Paush and cold. “There was the wife of the Jat and she performed great charity. By sending messengers to many places she brought in all the fugitives and drawing out grain at the rate of a payali each for thirty thousand men she ordered that every man should be given food for eight days in Bharatpur and a place to stay, that those of importance should be honorably conveyed back to their lands and those who were Brahmans she sent for and gave them milk, sweets and other delicacies and giving them also all provisions for their meals she supported them for eight days…she spent up to ten lakh of rupees. Parvatibai and Holkar and Nana Purandare had all come together, and there (at Bhind) they halted fifteen days. Then Surajmal Jat sent on to this stage a lakh of rupees and clothes in the charge of Ruparam Katari. From there Malharrao Holkar and Nana Purandare and Parvatibai and others went and remained for a month at Gwalior…Samsher Bahadur came wounded to Kumbher and there Surajmal Jat saw to his comfort in many ways and giving him horses and palanquin sent him on his way.”[22]

Conclusions

Like all important historical events the 1761 Panipat Battle has an interesting and varied historiography. Since the 19th Century, in which the Indian mind was modernised and historicised along Eurocentric nationalist lines, successive generations of Indian and foreign historians of the Marathas have interpreted and re-interpreted this battle.  In general, the nationalist and revisionist interpretations of Maratha history have informed our understanding of the Third Battle of Panipat (1761). The nationalists have almost always exaggerated the historical importance of this battle but history tells us that the defeat at Panipat did not signal the demise of Maratha power. In terms of political and economic consequences the smaller battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) were infinitely more significant than the Third Battle of Panipat. In the revisionist view of Maratha history the battle itself is not politically significant. Cooper, for instance, says the usually competent Marathas starved themselves into defeat at Panipat. [23] Shejwalkar asserted in 1946 that Bhausaheb was not understood by the refractory Maratha commanders. [24] He also warns against perceiving this battle in communal colours. According to Gommans the battle was more about the different ways of warfare practised by the Marathas and Afghans. On the fateful day Afghan technological superiority overwhelmed the Marathas [25]. Even the Maratha commander had placed his confidence in modern artillery during the Panipat campaign. Bhausaheb’s confidence in the French trained artillery captain Ibrahim Khan was vindicated at Kunjapura and Abdali subsequently wrote him letters encouraging subversion[26]:

You and we are of one race. At this time you should come over to us and we will give you lands worth twenty five lakhs of rupees together with the title of a nobleman of the empire. [27]

Minutes before the battle, Abdali’s envoy was turned away by the Marathas [28]. Malharrao reminded Bhausaheb of the several Afghans attempts at negotiation: “Peshji Pathanlok aaplekadun kitek velaa salookh karit astaan tumhi na kelaa.” [29] It seems Abdali, Shuja and Najib wanted to avoid battle having lost thousands of men in the conflict. They requested the Marathas to cooperate in safeguarding the Throne and not destroy the mulk by quarreling: “paraspar bhaandon mulukh budwava yaant vishesh kaiye aahe?[30] In reponse, Bhausaheb demanded 70 million rupees (saat kot) as reimbursement for expenses incurred on travelling 700 kos to Panipat with a huge army: “tumhi mandhtaa te amaalaas kabool, parantu saatshe kos aamhi chaalon aalon, fauj kiti apaar jhaali aahe, 70000000 saat kot rupaye kharch jhaalaa. To tumhi aamhaas dyaavaa aani aaple mulkhas jaave.”[31]

The Marathi sources represent the 18th century as a historical scene in which religion was important but did not determine the political choices of the actors described. The political loyalties of the 18th Century could be fluid and were not circumscribed by the religious affiliations of pre-colonial and pre-nationalist men and women. There were neither permanent enemies nor final solutions in a world where people did not think or act like we do as modern beings. If Ibrahim Khan stayed loyal, the Gosain warlords Anupgiri and Umraogiri fought for Shuja. Anupgiri’s naga troops also fought at Buxar in 1764 and he earned the sobriquet ‘Himmat Bahadur’ from Shuja.[32] In the 18th Century military expansion created a financial crisis in the Maratha state. The transformation of war-bands into standing armies and the growing importance of artillery affected Maratha tactical thinking. Nonetheless, veterans and women alike disliked the affectations of leaders like Dattaji. Sardars like Malharrao Holkar and Jayaji Shinde accepted the “code of Hindustan” to pursue individual interests. Maratha history reveals the strength of strategic flexibility, the dangers of cultural and military emulation and the crisis of military finance of the Indian warrior polities of the eighteenth century. In the turbulent 18th Century wise men eschewed adventurism: 

Ann panyavanchun ghodyamaansanche pran jatat. Pudhe Maharaj kaye tajvees saangne ti saangvi! Annaavaanchun haatpaaye sujale. Tarvar konti riti ni karavi?…Vinaashkaalsaarkhi tumchi buddhi jhaali. Aapanbarorbar aamhaa sarvaanchi ghare budtaat. Amchi randaapore aamchyaa dolyandekhat Irani ghyevoon jhato, asaa samay praapt jhaalaa. Tumche buddhis bhransh jhaalaa, manhoon aapan tilmatra konaache aikat nahin. Ugeech hekaa kelaa to yaa samay phalaas aalaa. Saaraanch aapan sarvanche manya karoon, salookh karoon, deshi gelon manhoon gandu jhaahaalon asaa arth naahin.[33]


References:
[1]For a concise view on this see Romila Thapar, The Past And Prejudice, NBT, New Delhi, 1993 and Richard King, Orientalism and the myth of Modern Hinduism, Critical Quest, New Delhi, 2008.

[2]Panipatchi Bakhar. Pune: Venus Prakashan, 1997, p. 48. Trans: Don’t be stubborn, as a seasoned soldier I have fought enemies for a long time. If you feel ashamed of going to Pune, we can retreat to the Ganga [Godavari], Narmada or Shipra, rejuvenate ourselves and teach the Pathans a lesson next year. As Hindus or Muslims we must uphold the Chatrapati’s prestige.

[3]Raeside, Ian.The Decade of Panipat (1751-61), Marathi Historical Papers and Chronicles: Bhausahebanchi Bakhar: Bombay:Popular Prakashan, 1984, p.3. (hereafter BB)

[4]BB.

[5]BB, pp. 4-6.

[6]BB, p.23.

[7]BB, pp. 71-72. The differences between the Jats and Marathas are mentioned in the Panipatchi Bakhar also. Surajmal asserted that the Jats were first the servants of the Emperor and protecting his seat (Takht) was the tradition of north India. Details of these differences and the destruction of the Takht are present in Herwadkar, R. V. (ed.). Panitpatchi Bakhar, Venus Prakashan, Pune, 1997, pp. 10-11 (written by Raghunath Yadav at the request of Gopikabai, widow of Nana Saheb) in 1763. The Bhausahebanchi Kaifiyat mentions the destruction of the Takht and Jat-Maratha differences; Herwadkar, R. V. (ed.). Bhausahebanchi Kaifiyat. Pune: Venus Prakashan 1990, p. 16.(Hereafter BK) This source is ascribed to a Deshasta Brahmin or someone who returned to the Deccan with a firsthand experience of the Panipat Campaign.

[8]Bhau Bakhar p. 73.

[9]Also mentioned in the Shelke, Nilesh Kedari (ed.) Holkaranchi Thaili. Mumbai: Aksharvedh Prakashan (hereafter HT) 2014, p. 31.

[10]HT, p.75.

[11]BB, p.7; BK, p. 13.

[12]BB, p.8; BK, pp. 16-17.

[13]BB, p. 134.

[14]BB, pp. 84-85.

[15]BB, p. 94; the Atmacharitra of Nana Phadnis in The Decade of Panipat (1751-61), Marathi Historical Papers and Chronicles

[16]BB (1984), p.38; (1990), pp. 84.

[17]BB, p.45; BK, pp. 97-98.

[18]BB, p.47; BK pp. 159-60.

[19]BB, p. 96.

[20]BB, p. 98.

[21]BB, p. 98.

[22]BB, p. 98.

[23]Cooper, Randolf. The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India- The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2005, Intro.

[24]Shejwalkar, Tryambak Shankar. Panipat: 1761. Pune: Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute Pune, 1992 [1946], pp. 106-27.

[25]See Gommans, Jos J. L. & Kolff Dirk, H. A. Warfare and Weaponry in South Asia 1000-1800. New Delhi: CUP, 2001.

[26]BB, p. 87; HT, p. 36, accuses Ibrahim Khan of having gained control over the Maratha Army.

[27]BB. The Marathi Bhausahebanchi Bakhar, p. 179 says: “tumhi aamhi ek jaat aahon. Ya samayin aamhaakade yaaven manje tumhala panchvees lakshancha mulukh deoon.

[28]BB, p. 88. HT, pp. 37-38, mentions this differently. The battle proceeded in two stages in the first of which the Maratha centre led by Ibrahim Khan and Bhausaheb inflicted a severe defeat on the unprepared enemy killing 5000 Pathans. The Maratha charge drove back the enemy seven kos (roughly 21 miles!). The demoralized forces of Shuja and Abdali were rallied by Mallika Zamani.

[29]HT, p.46.

[30]HT, p. 39.

[31]HT, p. 39. The BK. Pune: Venus Prakashan, 1990, p. 29 says negotiations broke down because of Bhausaheb’s obstinacy. Shuja and Abdali were willing to concede some important demands but Bhausaheb’s wanted Najib Khan Rohilla handed over and this was too much: “Rohilla aamche haatin dyava. Ashi aat yaanchi hoti.

[32]Pinch,William R. Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires. New Delhi:CUP, 2006, p. 106.

[33]Panipatchi Bakhar, p. 34, quotes Malharrao “We are in dire straits because of your obstinacy for which we must pay the price. If you listen to us, negotiate a peace and return to the Desh it will not mean that you have become a coward.” [gandu means coward here]

Anirudh Deshpande is Associate Professor at the Department of History, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Delhi. He has several academic papers, commentaries, reviews and articles to his credit. He has been a Nehru Fellow, UGC Fellow and ICHR Fellow in the past. He is also a published fiction writer.

One comment on “Investigating Marathi Primary Sources: Anirudh Deshpande

  1. Deepa kholia

    Very nice..

    Reply

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